Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz 110 S. Ct. 2481; (1990) DWI road blocks only allowed if detailed procedures
followed
Petitioners, the Michigan State
Police Department and its Director, established a highway sobriety checkpoint
program with guidelines governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and
publicity. During the only operation to date, 126 vehicles passed through the
checkpoint, the average delay per vehicle was 25 seconds, and two drivers were
arrested for driving under the influence. The day before that operation,
respondents, licensed Michigan drivers, filed suit in a county court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints.
After a trial, at which the court heard extensive testimony concerning, among
other things, the "effectiveness" of such programs, the court applied
the balancing test of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, and ruled that the State's program violated the Fourth
Amendment.
The State Court of Appeals
affirmed, agreeing with the lower court's findings that the State has a
"grave and legitimate" interest in curbing drunken driving; that
sobriety checkpoint programs are generally ineffective and, therefore, do not
significantly further that interest; and that, while the checkpoints' objective
intrusion on individual liberties is slight, their "subjective
intrusion" is substantial.
Held: Petitioner's
highway sobriety checkpoint program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
(a) United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 -- which utilized a balancing test in upholding checkpoints for
detecting illegal aliens -- and Brown v. Texas, supra, are the relevant
authorities to be used in evaluating the constitutionality of the State's
program. Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, was not designed to repudiate this Court's prior cases dealing
with police stops of motorists on public highways and, thus, does not forbid
the use of a balancing test here.
(b) A Fourth Amendment
"seizure" occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. See
Martinez-Fuerte, supra, at 556. Thus, the question here is whether such
seizures are "reasonable."
(c) There is no dispute about the
magnitude of, and the States' interest in eradicating, the drunken driving
problem. The courts below accurately gauged the "objective"
intrusion, measured by the seizure's duration and the investigation's
intensity, as minimal. However, they misread this Court's cases concerning the
degree of "subjective intrusion" and the potential for generating
fear and surprise. The "fear and surprise" to be considered are not
the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being
stopped at a checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law
abiding motorists by the nature of the particular stop, such as one made by a
roving patrol operating on a seldom-traveled road. Here, checkpoints are
selected pursuant to guidelines, and uniformed officers stop every vehicle. The
resulting intrusion is constitutionally indistinguishable from the stops upheld
in Martinez-Fuerte.
(d) The Court of Appeals
also erred in finding that the program failed the "effectiveness"
part of the Brown test.
This balancing factor --
which Brown actually describes as "the degree to which the seizure
advances the public interest" -- was not meant to transfer from
politically accountable officials to the courts the choice as to which among
reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal
with a serious public danger. Moreover, the court mistakenly relied on Martinez-Fuerte,
supra, and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, to provide a basis for its "effectiveness" review.
Unlike Delaware v.
Prouse, this case involves neither random stops nor a complete absence of
empirical data indicating that the stops would be an effective means of
promoting roadway safety. And there is no justification for a different
conclusion here than in Martinez-Fuerte, where the ratio of illegal
aliens detected to vehicles stopped was approximately .5 percent, as compared
with the approximately 1.5 percent detection ratio in the one checkpoint
conducted by Michigan and with the 1 percent ratio demonstrated by other
States' experience.
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