October 28, 2013

State of New Jersey v. Amir A. Andrews

 State of New Jersey v. Amir A. Andrews
(A-105-11;069594)

Gilmore’s single, bright-line remedy has proven
ineffective to fully and fairly respond to the use of
constitutionally impermissible peremptory challenges.
The Court modifies Gilmore and hereby permits trial
judges to choose from a broader set of remedies to
address the impermissible use of peremptory
challenges. 10-28-13

State of New Jersey v. Gene Hinton (A-3/4-12; 070386)

State of New Jersey v. Gene Hinton (A-3/4-12; 070386)

 Where, as here, an eviction proceeding has advanced to
the point that a warrant of removal has been executed,
a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the premises. Therefore, the police action
in Hinton’s apartment was not a “search” under either
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
or Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution. 10-24-13

October 20, 2013

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LARRY R. HENDERSON



  STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LARRY R. HENDERSON


A-5482-11T3

In its landmark decision in this case, State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for a new Wade hearing. Applying the Court's new state constitutional framework for such matters, the trial court denied suppression of the out-of-court eyewitness identification evidence used to convict defendant. On appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the new framework implicitly imposed on the

prosecution the burden of proving reliability by "clear and convincing evidence." In light of the language of the Supreme Court's opinion that, once a defendant provides evidence of suggestiveness the prosecution must "offer proof to show that the proffered eyewitness identification is reliable," id. at 289, the court rejected this argument, viewing the prosecution's burden as little different and no more onerous than the "burden of producing evidence" described in N.J.R.E. 101(b)(2).

Affirmed. 10-17-13

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVID GRANSKIE, JR. A-6278-11T4

 STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DAVID GRANSKIE, JR.

A-6278-11T4

The question presented by this appeal is whether respondent AIG Casualty Company, which paid workers' compensation benefits to petitioner, Kelly Greene, is entitled to a lien against her settlement with a third-party tortfeasor pursuant to Section 40 of the Workers' Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, even though her injury was ultimately noncompensable.

Nothing in either Section 15 or Section 40 conditions reimbursement of the claim from a third-party settlement on whether the benefits the employer paid were owed in the first place. Read in conjunction, Section 40 and our collateral source statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97, plainly require that a third-party tortfeasor be held to the full extent of its liability for a workplace injury, that the employer be repaid for benefits paid to the injured worker pursuant to the Act without regard to the compensability of the claim, and that the employee not obtain a double recovery. AIG is entitled to its lien. 10-16-13

 

State v. Osborne S. Maloney (A-64-11; 068877)

 State v. Osborne S. Maloney (A-64-11; 068877)

 The trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte
instruct the jury on accomplice liability and by
rejecting defendant’s request to charge the jury on
the asserted lesser-included offenses of attempted
theft by receiving stolen property and conspiracy to
receive stolen property. 10-16-13

October 9, 2013

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.A. A-6175-10T4


STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.A.
A-6175-10T4
In this PCR case, presented after an evidentiary hearing on remand, we explicate the familiar Strickland prejudice standard, requiring a defendant to show "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 (1984). We note the test is not outcome determinative; "reasonable probability" does not mean more likely than not; it means "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ibid. We address the prejudice prong's application to a claim that counsel failed to call an exculpatory witness. We conclude a court must assess the absent or uncalled witness's credibility in light of the totality of the circumstances. The issue is not whether the absent witness is more credible than the State's witness; it is whether the absent witness'stestimony sufficiently undermined confidence in the result. The court's ultimate goal is to assess the challenged trial's fairness and reliability.
Here, the trial judge found the absent witness credible, but denied relief because he perceived the victim-witness more credible. We reverse the court's denial of PCR because the court failed to consider the totality of circumstances, and misapplied the test for determining prejudice under Strickland. 10-08-13 

State of New Jersey v. Terrence Miller (A-35-11; 068558)


State of New Jersey v. Terrence Miller
(A-35-11; 068558)
The trial judge’s denial of an adjournment did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective representation, was not an abuse of discretion, and did not violate principles of fundamental fairness. 10-2-13

State v. William O’Driscoll (A-7-12; 070438)


State v. William O’Driscoll (A-7-12; 070438)
The police officer’s errors in the reading of the standard statement informing defendant of the consequences of refusing to provide a breath sample were not material in light of the statutory purpose to inform motorists and impel compliance. The officer’s misstatements could not have reasonably affected defendant’s choice to refuse to provide a breath sample, and do not require reversal of defendant’s conviction for refusal. 9-18-13

State v. Robert Handy (A-68-11; 069022)


State v. Robert Handy (A-68-11; 069022)
The bifurcated trial procedure created in State v.
Kahn, 175 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div. 1980), is
disapproved and that decision is overruled. In the future, trials that involve both a substantive defense and an insanity defense must be unitary proceedings. The matter is remanded to the trial court to afforddefendant the opportunity to continue in a second phase of his trial which he may present his self- defense claim. 9-9-13