May 26, 2010

STATE v. RILEY JEFFERSON a/k/a SYNCERE RILEY JEFFERSON (A-1945-06T4)

STATE v. RILEY JEFFERSON a/k/a SYNCERE RILEY JEFFERSON (A-1945-06T4) 05-21-10

(1) In the absence of a warrant or a recognized exception
from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the police
could not lawfully enter defendant's home to conduct a Terry-
type detention and investigation of defendant.

(2) A police officer's wedging herself in the doorway to
prevent defendant from closing his front door was entry into the
home.

(3) The police failed to show either "hot pursuit" exigent
circumstances or a community caretaking exception from the
warrant requirement.

(4) Although the police entry was unlawful, defendant had
no right to resist physically, and the search of his person
incident to arrest was lawful.

(5) Consent to search defendant's apartment, given by
defendant's wife, was tainted by the unconstitutional police
conduct and was not shown to be voluntary.

May 23, 2010

US Supreme Court Cases dealing with criminal law and procedure

US Supreme Court Cases dealing with criminal law and procedure
By Kenneth Vercammen Past Vice Chair ABA Criminal Law Committee General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Division

1. No specific words required for Miranda warnings Florida v. Powell 175 L.Ed 1009 __ S. Ct. ___ (Dec. 7, 2009)

In a state prosecution for possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, a reversal of defendant's conviction on Miranda grounds is reversed where the police satisfied Miranda's requirements by informing defendant that he had "the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of their questions," and that he had "the right to use any of his rights at any time he wanted during the interview.
Advice that a suspect has “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the law enforcement officers’] questions,” and that he can invoke this right “at any time . . . during the interview,” satisfies Miranda.

2 US Supreme Court Rules Lab Report Not Admissible in Criminal Case. Melendez-Diaz v. Mass 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009)
Defendant's drug conviction is reversed, where the trial court's admission of the prosecution's certificates by laboratory analysts, stating that material seized by police and connected to Defendant was cocaine of a certain quantity, violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.
3 Police May Interrogate Even if Public Defender Assigned. Montejo v. Louisiana 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009)

Michigan v. Jackson, which forbids police from initiating interrogation of a criminal defendant once he has invoked his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding, is overturned. Source: New Jersey Law Journal June 1, 2009

4. School Officials Cannot Search Child’s Underwear for Drugs. Safford Unified School. Dist. No. 1. v. Redding 129 S.Ct. 2633 (2009)

In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action alleging an unlawful search of a student, the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where the search of Plaintiff's underwear violated the Fourth Amendment because the facts did not give school officials reasonable suspicion to search her underwear.


5. 
US v. Stevens, No. 08–769
 U.S. Supreme Court, April 20, 2010 The Third Circuit's reversal of defendant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. section 48 for selling videos depicting dog fighting is affirmed where section 48 was substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment, because section 48 explicitly regulated expression based on content and was thus presumptively invalid

5. Padilla v Kentucky ___ S. Ct. _____ No. 08–651. Argued October 13, 2009 —Decided March 31, 2010
Petitioner Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 40 years, faced deportation after pleading guilty to drug-distribution charges in Kentucky. In post conviction proceedings, he claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence before he entered the plea, but also told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived in this country so long. He alleges that he would have gone to trial had he not received this incorrect advice The US Supreme Court held Because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient

6. Police can Enter Home Under Emergency Aid Exception Michigan v. Fisher 130 S. Ct 546 U.S. Supreme Court December 07, 2009
 No. 09–91

In an assault prosecution, grant of petitioner's motion to suppress evidence that he pointed a rifle at an officer when he entered his house is reversed where the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he was responding to a report of a disturbance and encountered a tumultuous situation in the house, which justified a warrantless search under the emergency aid exception

May 21, 2010

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RICKY SESSOMS (A-1488-09T4)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RICKY SESSOMS (A-1488-09T4) 5-17-10

On the strength of an affidavit purportedly authored by a
confidential informant, a defendant charged with drug and
weapons possession offenses obtained a pretrial order compelling
the State to "confirm or deny" the informant's identity. We
reverse the order, as the privilege belongs to the State and not
the informer, and the circumstances in this case did not satisfy
the "disclosure" exception found in N.J.R.E. 516.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RICKY SESSOMS (A-1488-09T4)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RICKY SESSOMS (A-1488-09T4) 5-17-10

On the strength of an affidavit purportedly authored by a
confidential informant, a defendant charged with drug and
weapons possession offenses obtained a pretrial order compelling
the State to "confirm or deny" the informant's identity. We
reverse the order, as the privilege belongs to the State and not
the informer, and the circumstances in this case did not satisfy
the "disclosure" exception found in N.J.R.E. 516.

May 14, 2010

BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION V. CHRIS CHRISTIE, GOVERNOR OF NJ

BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION V. CHRIS CHRISTIE, GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

A-2871-09T2/A-2996-09T2/A-2997-09T2 (consolidated)

05-07-10
Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 7, 42 N.J.R. 580(b)
(January 20, 2010) ("EO 7"), which seeks to extend "pay-to-play"
restrictions on political campaign contributions to labor
organizations, violates principles of separation of powers under
article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.
In particular, EO 7's intended treatment of collective
bargaining agreements as "contracts" and labor unions as
"business entities" is fundamentally incompatible with existing
laws and statutes, and thus impermissibly encroaches upon lawmaking
powers delegated by the people to the Legislature under
the 1947 Constitution.
The provision is invalidated, effective July 1, 2010,
without prejudice to the future potential adoption of
appropriate legislation enacting pay-to-play reforms covering
labor organizations, in a manner consistent with or amending, as
necessary, existing laws.

May 12, 2010

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. ORION T. BRABHAM A-3571-07T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. ORION T. BRABHAM
A-3571-07T4 4-30-10

Defendant primarily objects to the denial of his motion to
suppress statements he made to New Jersey law enforcement
officers after he was incarcerated for a parole violation in New
York. Accepting the judge's factual findings, we conclude that
the statements, which the judge found were made during a meeting
defendant requested to negotiate a plea, should have been
excluded pursuant to N.J.R.E. 410.

State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09)

State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09) 5-6-10

The officers presented sufficient facts in the
totality of the circumstances that would create in a
police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by
ordering the passenger to exit the car. Those same
circumstances authorize a police officer to open a
5-6-10 State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09)

The officers presented sufficient facts in the
totality of the circumstances that would create in a
police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by
ordering the passenger to exit the car. Those same
circumstances authorize a police officer to open a
vehicle door as part of ordering a passenger to exit.
Thus, the seizure of the weapon was proper under the
plain view doctrine, and the seizure of the holster
and loaded magazine from the passenger was lawful as the fruits of a proper search incident to an arrest.

State v. Duane Kelly (A-24-09)

State v. Duane Kelly (A-24-09) 5-4-10

The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate
Division upholding defendant’s murder, felony-murder,
and armed-robbery convictions. Defendant’s second
trial was not barred by the principles of collateral
estoppel, which are incorporated in the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Because of the seemingly
inconsistent verdicts in the first trial, defendant
cannot establish that the jury determined an ultimate
fact that precluded a retrial of the reversed
convictions. Moreover, even if the verdicts were not
inconsistent, the Court would not be inclined to apply
the constitutional-equitable doctrine of collateral
estoppel when the ultimate issue defendant seeks to
preclude from relitigation is one that might well have
been founded on a defense witness’s perjured
testimony, testimony that tainted both the acquittals
and convictions in the first tria

May 5, 2010

State v. Frank Dellisanti (A-29-09)

State v. Frank Dellisanti (A-29-09) 4-27-10

The arrest of defendant Frank Dellisanti for a
probation violation during jury deliberations in his
unrelated criminal trial violated his right under Rule
3:16(b) to be present through the trial’s conclusion
and the rendering of the verdict. Because the record
does not establish that the Rule’s conditions for
waiver were satisfied, the Court reverses Dellisanti’s
convictions and remands for a new trial.

STATE v. KARL LESTER MURPHY (A-3693-08T4)

TATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KARL LESTER MURPHY A-3693-08T4

We held that the trial judge's rulings, authorizing the
State to use a seventeen-year-old prior conviction to impeach
defendant's credibility and permitting the prosecutor to argue
that a testifying police officer had no incentive to lie,
deprived defendant of his right to a fair trial. We agreed with
defendant's contention that the prosecutor's summation exceeded
the boundaries of legitimate advocacy when she vouched for the
credibility of her witness. We likewise agreed with defendant's
claim that because he had no intervening convictions, this
seventeen-year-old conviction was so stale that its probative
value was vastly outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and the
judge therefore erred by permitting the State to use it to
impeach his credibility. In this trial, where the State's
proofs were far from overwheerrors harmless.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. E.W. A-0146-08T4 (4-27-10)

STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. E.W. A-0146-08T4 (4-27-10)

We held that defendant was entitled to post-conviction
relief consisting of vacation of an illegal sentence when
evidence demonstrated that defendant had committed a sexual
assault on a juvenile in 1979 when the statute of limitations
for the offense was five years, the statute of limitations on
the offense had expired prior to the amendment of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
6 in 1986 to exempt sexual assault from the five-year bar, and
defendant was not indicted for the crime until 1991. Any
application of the 1986 version of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 to preserve
the claim against defendant violated the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause, and thus both his conviction and sentence were
illegal.