February 5, 2008

State of New Jersey in the Interest of D.Y.

02-04-08 A-0490-07T4

The prosecutor filed a complaint in the Family Part
charging a juvenile with aggravated assault that led to the
victim's death. More than 30 days later, after further
investigation indicated that the juvenile had far greater
responsibility for the death, the prosecutor dismissed the first
complaint and filed a second complaint charging murder. Within
30 days of the second filing, the prosecutor moved for waiver of
the murder complaint to the Law Division, where the juvenile
would be tried as an adult. We reversed the denial of the
prosecutor's motion, holding: (1) the motion was timely because
the 30 time limit of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26(d) and Rule 5:22-2(a) did
not begin to run on the murder complaint until it was filed; (2)
the development of the additional incriminatory evidence after
the filing of the first complaint provided good cause for an
extension of the 30-day time limit even if that time began to
run from the filing of the first complaint.

State v. Quinn Marshall

01-29-08 A-3397-05T4

A judge issued a search warrant for an apartment in a
multiple unit structure but required that the police further
investigate which of two apartments was allegedly involved in
criminality; he did not require that the police return with this
additional, necessary information, but instead issued the
warrant on the condition that it not be executed until that
additional information was obtained. The court concluded that
this process violated the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant be issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate"
because the judge ceded his authority to the discretion of the
police.

The State also argued that the warrant was sufficient
insofar as it had authorized the police to search whichever
apartment was "controlled" or "possessed" by a particular
person. The court held that this loose description did not
conform to the constitutional requirement that the place to be
searched be "particularly describe[d]" in the warrant.

State v. Morgan C. Scott

01-28-08* A-5813-03T4
The primary issue in this case was whether defendant
actually or constructively possessed cocaine that was found in
the vehicle in which he was a passenger. With one judge
dissenting, we affirmed the trial court's decision to deny
defendant's motion for acquittal and his motion for a new trial.
But we remanded for a determination regarding the voluntariness
of statements attributed to defendant and for resentencing.
[*Approved for Publication date]

State v. Ernest J. Read, III

01-24-08 A-1751-03T4

In determining whether to waive a charge of a Chart 1
offense against a juvenile over the age of sixteen, the Family
Part is not required to consider the juvenile's alleged
psychological impairments. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26, which authorizes
the Family Part to waive jurisdiction to adult court based on
judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence, does
not violate a juvenile-defendant's jury trial rights under the
principles set forth in Apprendi and Blakely.

February 4, 2008

State v. B.M.

01-11-08 A-4075-06T5

We hold that a defendant's decision to introduce certain
evidence may trigger the right of the State to rebut any unfair
implication of that evidence. In this matter where sexual abuse
is alleged by a ten-year-old child, we affirm the trial court's
exercise of discretion to permit the defendant to elicit on
cross-examination that the child had also alleged separate
incidents of sexual abuse by three other persons. We remand,
however, for further consideration, in light of the doctrine of
"opening the door," as to whether the State may introduce
evidence of juvenile delinquency adjudications pursuant to
guilty pleas by the other three alleged abusers.

State v. Thomas Conroy, Jr.

01-09-08 A-2384-06T5

The question presented is whether a defendant, who has had
three prior convictions for DWI, is entitled to the benefit of
the ten-year step-down provision of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) on a
fourth conviction, where the first conviction was entered by way
of an uncounseled plea. We answer the question in the
affirmative, determining that when defendant appeared before the
Law Division he stood as a third offender, not a fourth
offender, for the limited purpose of the trial court imposing a
jail sentence under the enhanced sentencing provision of the DWI
statute.

State v. David L. Wilder

1-31-08 (A-87-06)

Based on the State’s evidence and giving the State the benefit
of all favorable inferences, a jury reasonably could have
convicted defendant of serious-bodily-injury murder; thus, the
trial court did not err by sending the murder charge to the
jury. The Court rejects continued use of the Christener rule;
overcharging errors must be reviewed under the “unjust result”
standard established in Rule 2:10-2.

State v. George Jenewicz

1-28-08 (A-78-06)

The cumulative impact of the trial court’s preclusion of
testimony from two defense witnesses and the prosecution’s
improper cross-examination of the defense expert and
disparagement of the defense expert during summation prejudiced
the fairness of defendant’s trial and cast doubt on the
propriety of the jury’s verdict, warranting a new trial.

State v. Manuel B. Ortiz

1-17-08 (A-109-06)

Krol periodic review hearings must be held for those defendants
acquitted by reason of insanity who are committed under N.J.S.A.
2C:4-8(b)(3) as well as for those who are released subject to
supervision or conditions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(2), but
not for those who are released without supervision or conditions
as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(b)(1).

State v. Frederick T. Hamilton

1-16-08 (A-57-06)

The trial court erred in concluding that it had no ability to
ameliorate the undue prejudice to defendant through sanitization
of his earlier conviction. This Court’s prior holding that
sanitization is mandatory in situations in which a prior
conviction is the same or similar to the present charge did not
foreclose from trial courts the discretion to consider
sanitization in other circumstances that pose a risk of undue
prejudice to a defendant.

State v. Morgan Scott

1-10-08 (A-115-06)

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially
for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division’s majority
opinion.