June 21, 2011

Defendant's Reckless, Self-Created Conduct Triggered the Plain View Exception: State v Plummer

Defendant's Reckless, Self-Created Conduct Triggered the Plain View Exception
State v Plummer

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2805-09T3

Submitted May 25, 2011 – Decided June 7, 2011

Before Judges R. B. Coleman and J. N. Harris.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 08-09-2160.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Grover Plummer was convicted by a jury of two counts of third-degree possession of controlled dangerous substances, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a), and sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of five years.[1] He appeals, and raises the following arguments:

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

POINT II: THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS OF PROPRIETY. (NOT RAISED BELOW)

POINT III: THE SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO IMPOSE A DISCRETIONARY EXTENDED TERM.

POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT PROPERLY HAVE IMPOSED A DISCRETIONARY EXTENDED TERM ON COUNT I AS WELL AS ON COUNT II. (NOT RAISED BELOW)

From our review of the record, we are satisfied that none of these points are meritorious, except for Point IV. We affirm the conviction and aggregate sentence, but remand for clarification of the judgment of conviction to eliminate one of the two extended terms.

I.

On May 28, 2010, five Asbury Park police officers were engaged in a street crime operation when one received information suggesting that Plummer —— known locally as Gaggi —— was selling controlled dangerous substances along Springwood Avenue.[2] Sergeant Michael Barnes and Officer Lorenzo Petway drove an undercover vehicle to the vicinity of Springwood Avenue and began making observations of Plummer, who was on Ridge Avenue. Seeing nothing amiss, the police officers nevertheless decided to approach Plummer, who at that point was approximately 100 feet away. Plummer was walking towards the police officers, but when they were about twelve feet apart, Plummer looked up, turned, and jogged away in the opposite direction. The police officers followed, but almost immediately Plummer tripped at the curb and fell while the police were approximately four to six feet away. As he fell, Plummer let go of an object that he was holding in his right hand. As it hit the pavement, Sergeant Barnes saw that it was "an off white object." When he retrieved it, Sergeant Barnes observed, "it was inside of a clear plastic, similar to a plastic bag that —— torn off of it, like it was pinched off and twisted at the end. And then [Sergeant Barnes] looked at it, and through [his] training and experience [he] recognized it to be crack cocaine."

The remaining four police officers attempted to subdue and handcuff Plummer, who resisted their efforts to do so. Eventually, he was restrained and placed under arrest, and in the resultant search of his person, a bag containing nine bags of heroin was found clutched in Plummer's left hand, together with paraphernalia used to ingest crack cocaine.

Plummer claims that when he first encountered the police officers, he thought he was about to be robbed by "gang bangers and stuff around here."[3] At the suppression motion he testified,

I didn't even know who it was. I didn't know who it was. Because it could have been, you know, somebody coming to rob me or beat me up or anything, because I ain't too long —— I just got home from my being incarcerated. So I didn't know who it was when they pulled me. Then, later I find out that it was the cops.

Plummer claimed that the police officers were neither wearing badges nor other identification, and they did not announce who they were. Wary of the situation, Plummer said that it was his intention to flee. However, because he had recently suffered a stroke he was unable to run, and instead fell. The police officers then "jumped on top of [him]" while he was yelling, "I ain't got nothing." Plummer adamantly denied possessing any drugs.

II.

A.

Plummer first argues that the Law Division erred in not suppressing the evidence seized from him on the day of his arrest. He asserts that the police lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, and that the State's reliance on the sequelae of a field inquiry, as opposed to an investigative detention, was baseless. The Law Division determined that if Plummer's version were to be credited, then "this clearly never reached the stage of a Terry[[4]] stop until the police were on top of him." Accordingly, because there was no order to stop —— indeed, there was no tangible interaction between Plummer and the police officers because Plummer fled upon fearing for his safety without knowing their identity —— the recovery of the evidence was appropriate because it came into plain view due to the conduct of Plummer.

Alternatively, the Law Division held that due to the informant's specific disclosures, which were confirmed by Plummer being located at the place and time indicated by the informant, the police had probable cause to minimally engage Plummer, even though at the time they had not personally witnessed any criminal activities. Thus, in primary reliance upon State v. Hughes, 296 N.J. Super. 291, 296 (App. Div.) (defendant on a bicycle held to have abandoned a container filled with bags of cocaine, because he threw the container against a curb when he noticed a police car approaching, but before he was seized or ordered to stop), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 410 (1997), the Law Division concluded that the seizure of the evidence did not offend the Fourth Amendment, and denied the motion to suppress.

We recognize that under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, "[a] warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 664 (2000); see also State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 230 (1981). Here such an exception to the warrant requirement is fulfilled under the "stop and frisk" principles enunciated in Terry. Also, when the police officers initially approached Plummer on the street, they "were permitted to make a field inquiry 'without grounds for suspicion.'" State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001); see also State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (defining a field inquiry as "the least intrusive encounter, which occurs when a police officer approaches an individual and asks 'if [he or she] is willing to answer some questions'" (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003))). "A field inquiry is permissible so long as the questions '[are] not harassing, overbearing or accusatory in nature.'" Pineiro, supra, 181 N.J. at 20.

The police officers had a justified basis to stop Plummer and ask about his identity and why he was in the area. Of course, the situation never even reached that stage, because Plummer turned and tried to run. His reckless, self-created conduct resulted in his dropping the cocaine, which triggered the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

A warrant is not required to perform a search when a police officer is (1) lawfully present in the viewing area, (2) the officer inadvertently discovers the evidence in plain view, and (3) it is "immediately apparent" to the police officer that the "items in plain view were evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure." State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 206-07 (2002); see also State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S. Ct. 1295, 79 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1984). The motion judge credited Sergeant Barnes's observations of Plummer's conduct, which resulted in the revelation of the contraband. We defer to the motion judge's adoption of such factual narrative. See State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 336-37 (2010); State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999). As such, we have no basis to disturb the Law Division's decision to uphold the seizure of the evidence and allow its use during trial.

B.

Plummer next argues that the prosecutor's summation exceeded the bounds of propriety. Specifically, Plummer takes issue with two comments about the jury's credibility assessment of the testifying police officers, who were said to "have no stake here, their lives don't change no matter what you come back with." These comments were in response to defense counsel's strident arguments that the police officers were possibly corrupt, had planted the contraband on Plummer, and had likely lied to support one another during the trial.

Because Plummer did not object to the prosecutor's comments at the time of the summation, we review this argument under the lens of plain error as articulated in Rule 2:10-2. Under this standard, we will not reverse on the basis of such error unless we find it was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ibid. The possibility of producing an unjust result "must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). Moreover, our assessment of plain error "depends on an evaluation of the overall strength of the State's case." State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006). Furthermore, the absence of an objection at the time the alleged error occurred may well indicate that counsel did not consider such error to be significant in the context of the trial. Macon, supra, 57 N.J. at 333.

We find that the summation comments were entirely incapable of producing the undue prejudice claimed by Plummer. Not only were they fleeting in nature, but they were both accurate and fair comments. The claim that having no stake in the outcome of the case somehow unjustly bolsters the police officers' credibility borders on the far-fetched.

A prosecutor's "'primary duty . . . is not to obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done.'" State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999) (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 320 (1987)). In summation, prosecutors may "make vigorous and forceful closing arguments to juries" based on the evidence and all reasonable inferences. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 587 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001). Additionally, they may vigorously rebut specific arguments made by defense counsel. State v. Mahoney, 188 N.J. 359, 376-77 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 995, 127 S. Ct. 507, 166 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2006). We are satisfied that the challenged commentary in this case falls well within the mainstream of permissible comment during summation by a prosecutor and does not warrant our intervention.

C.

Plummer's next two arguments challenge the sentence imposed by the Law Division. In particular, he contends that the imposition of an extended term was unwarranted and the five-year period of incarceration was manifestly excessive. These arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in this opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Our review of sentencing decisions is "relatively narrow and is governed by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010) (citing State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 401 (1989)). Plummer was concededly extended-term-eligible in light of his age, extensive prior criminal history, and nature of the crimes for which he was convicted. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). Furthermore, the circumstance that the aggregate term in this case lies within the range of third-degree crimes fortifies the view that it does not shock the conscience. See State v. Bieniek, 200 N.J. 601, 612 (2010); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 365-66 (1984). Therefore, the sentence imposed by the court was neither an abuse of discretion, nor manifestly unjust.

The judgment of conviction, however, must be clarified and corrected in one respect. Because the sentencing judge imposed similar —— if not identical —— five-year sentences on counts one and two, without expressly indicating which count would bear the extended term, it is plausible that extended terms were imposed on both. If that is what the sentencing court intended, it was in error, as there may be only one extended term pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a)(2). See State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 627 (2000) ("[A] court may impose only one extended term on one sentencing occasion."). The case is remanded solely for the purpose of clarifying the judgment of conviction to eliminate one count from the extended term calculus.


Affirmed in part and remanded in part to amend the judgment of conviction.

[1] Following the jury verdict, the Law Division tried Plummer on related disorderly persons charges of possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2, and resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1). The court found Plummer guilty, and imposed terms of incarceration of thirty days and ninety days respectively, to be served concurrently with the two concurrent five-year terms for the indictable offenses.

[2] The record indicates that Springwood Avenue is also known as Lake Avenue.

[3] Plummer testified only during the motion to suppress, and not at the trial.

[4] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)


Behavior Did Not Recklessly Create Risk of Public Inconvenience: State v Davis

Behavior Did Not Recklessly Create Risk of Public Inconvenience

State v Davis

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5172-09T2

Submitted May 17, 2011 - Decided

Before Judges Carchman and Waugh.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Municipal Appeal No. 10-013.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Colleen A. Davis appeals her conviction on one count of disorderly conduct, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a). We reverse.

I.

We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.

On December 14, 2007, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Officers Jason Lopez and Tiffany Dill of the Keansburg Police Department were in a patrol vehicle, with Lopez driving. Another officer requested them to locate Donald Neri, who was believed to be a passenger in an SUV driven by Davis, his girlfriend. Neri had been identified as a suspect with respect to a pending criminal-mischief investigation.

Lopez spotted Davis's SUV in a residential area, and proceeded to pull it over using his flashing lights and siren. At the time, he and Dill only observed Davis in the SUV, but they subsequently observed a child in the back seat. As Lopez was calling in the stop, Davis got out of her SUV and approached the patrol car. According to Lopez, Davis was "screaming, her hands were waving out. She seemed pretty upset. She was shouting profanities . . . ." According to Dill, Davis got out of her SUV and became "irate," and was "yelling, screaming, cursing" and came "running towards the front of [the] patrol vehicle."

After Dill succeeded in getting Davis to return to her SUV, both officers approached it. They told Davis that they were looking for Neri. According to Lopez, Davis became "more upset again," with "[h]er arms . . . going up and down." Lopez described her as "extremely upset, aggressively." She "continued to yell and curse . . . for another 30 seconds until other officers arrived." Dill testified that, once Davis returned to the SUV, she "was continuously still yelling, cursing, saying that we had absolutely no reason to pull her over."

Dill asked Davis to get out of the SUV because of the young child in the back. Despite Dill's efforts to calm Davis down, she continued "yelling and cursing and flailing her arms." After approximately a minute of that conduct, Dill placed Davis under arrest.

Both Lopez and Dill testified that there were residents in the area who witnessed the events described above. According to Lopez, people appeared to "com[e] outside because the commotion that Ms. Davis was creating was loud and people just came outside." Dill also testified that "[p]eople were coming out of their houses. They were stepping out onto the sidewalk." When asked on cross-examination whether "there were actually people there watching what was going on," Dill responded that "[t]hey were located in front of their houses . . . [or] standing in their doorway," and that there "were kids standing out on the sidewalk."

The municipal court trial was held on February 1, 2010, with Lopez and Dill as the only witnesses. After the State rested, Davis moved unsuccessfully for an acquittal. Davis then rested. After hearing summations, during which defense counsel pointed out discrepancies between the testimony given by Lopez and Dill and the report written by another officer, the municipal judge gave a detailed oral opinion, finding Davis guilty. He imposed a fine of $56, together with costs and the required assessments and penalties.

Davis appealed her conviction to the Law Division, which heard the matter de novo on the record on May 20, 2010. The Law Division judge found Davis guilty, explaining his decision as follows:

From the moment the police initiated their investigatory stop, defendant was foul-mouthed, uncooperative, and aggressive. This was not a situation where the defendant simply cursed at the officers or made a menacing gesture.

The credible evidence indicates that the defendant's language, demeanor, and body movements evidenced a response entirely disproportionate to the police stop and attempted inquiry, and taken together evidenced a person who was nearly out of control. Defendant had to be told repeatedly to return to her vehicle. Once in her vehicle, she continued shouting, flailing, and cursing despite repeated admonishments by the police to calm down, so that the reason for the stop could be explained to her.

. . . .

It is evident that [the municipal judge] found the consistent parts of the officers' testimony to be credible. The officers' testimony is not rendered incredible just because the police report did not contain every observation testified to in court. Further, [the judge] made his credibility findings with all of the above information available to him. This [c]ourt will, therefore, defer to [the judge's] findings with regard to the issue of credibility as he had the opportunity to observe the testimony and get a feel for the case, which this [c]ourt as the reviewing court cannot enjoy.

Finally, defendant contends that the [S]tate failed to show that defendant engaged in "tumultuous behavior" under the statute. "Tumultuous behavior" is not defined in the statute, and the Appellate Division has noted it is, "hard-pressed to ascertain its definitional parameters." State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 247, 254 (App. Div. 2001). "Tumult" is defined as "a disorderly agitation or milling about of a crowd usually with uproar and confusion of voices," or as a "violent agitation of mind or feelings." Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, 11th Edition (2005). In State v. Stampone, the Appellate Division found that slamming a car door so that it almost hit a police officer did not, by itself, constitute "tumultuous behavior" which could give rise to a disorderly persons charge.

As [the municipal judge] aptly observed, "When one is stopped by the police, one has several options. The options are to respond in a reasonable manner to the questions asked or to decline to respond. One can even speak disrespectfully in a normal voice, but when one raises one's voice, refuses to respond in a timely way to police instructions, flails one's arms, and hurls curses repeatedly at the police, the situation is one which is ripe for escalation, particularly if there are other people present who may be drawn into the melee."

Thus, the [c]ourt finds that the evidence in this matter supports a finding that defendant's behavior was, indeed, a "violent agitation of mind or feelings," which recklessly created a risk of "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm." See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a). As such, defendant's behavior meets the requirements of the statute, and the defendant was properly found guilty of improper behavior in violation of the statute.

The Law Division judge imposed the same sentence as the municipal judge. This appeal followed.

II.

Davis raises the following issue on appeal:

POINT I: DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

The State argues that the conviction was supported by the record and that Davis's conduct violated N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a).

Our role in an appeal such as this one is limited, in that we "consider only the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961)). The Law Division determination is de novo on the record from the municipal court, Rule 3:23-8(a), but the Law Division judge must give "due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of the magistrate to judge the credibility of the witnesses." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964). We are ordinarily limited to determining whether the Law Division's de novo findings "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Id. at 162. Nevertheless, our review of purely legal issues is plenary. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995); State v. Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 225 (App. Div. 2010), certif. denied, 205 N.J. 78 (2011).

The summons issued to Davis charged her with "knowingly and purposely" committing "the act of improper behavior specifically by being loud, uncooperative by not following police direction during an investigation of an assault that occurred," which was said to be in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2(a). We note, initially, that (1) the trial testimony referred to an investigation involving criminal mischief, rather than an assault, and (2) Davis was found guilty of engaging in "tumultuous behavior" and not of being "uncooperative by not following police direction during [the] investigation."

Subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Disorderly conduct

a. Improper behavior. A person is guilty of a petty disorderly persons offense, if with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he

(1) Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; . . . .

. . . .

"Public" means affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood.

In finding Davis guilty, the Law Division judge focused on "tumultuous behavior." Consequently, the State was obligated to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis, "with purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof," engaged in "tumultuous behavior."

We do not address the issue of whether there was evidence in the record to support a finding that Davis actually acted "purposely" to cause "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" because the judge did not make a finding of purposeful conduct. Instead we turn to the issue of whether the record supports the judge's finding of reckless conduct.

N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3) defines "recklessly" as follows:

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.

[(Emphasis added).]

Davis was angry at the police officers and acting inappropriately, but we see no support in the record for a finding that she was "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that" her conduct would result in "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm."

There was no evidence that there was "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm." Although there was testimony by Lopez and Dill that members of the public had come out of their houses to observe what was going on, the municipal judge perceptively noted that there was "no way of knowing why they came out of their houses. They may have heard sirens, they may have seen the lights on the police vehicles. . . . We will never know one way or another."

There was no testimony that anyone complained to the police about Davis's conduct, and no member of the public testified. In fact the police did not interview any of the bystanders. There was also no testimony that any member of the public took Davis's side during the encounter or in any way menaced or interfered with the police officers. A conclusion that there was "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" or a realistic risk of such a condition would be based on pure speculation.

In State v. Stampone, 341 N.J. Super. 247, 254-55 (App. Div. 2001) (emphasis added), we addressed the meaning of "tumultuous behavior" as follows:

Defendant does not challenge the phrase "tumultuous behavior" as unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, although we are hard-pressed to ascertain its definitional parameters. The dictionary definition of tumult speaks in terms of a disorderly and violent movement, agitation or milling about of a crowd, usually with great uproar and confusion of voices, a noisy and turbulent popular uprising, a riot. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2462 (1993). For present purposes, it is sufficient to find that on the facts here presented there was no tumultuous conduct as a matter of law.

Unlike the Law Division judge, we do not read Stampone as warranting a finding of "tumultuous behavior" when someone is angry at the police and engages in the conduct described by the police witnesses who testified at trial, even if they are flailing their arms and impassioned. Stampone speaks in terms of a turbulent crowd or a riot, not the excited, or even excessively offensive, conduct of one person acting alone. Davis was not part of an unruly crowd nor was she participating in a riot.

In short, although we defer to the Law Division judge's finding of fact, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Davis's actions, which took place over the period of a few minutes at most, did not "recklessly creat[e] a risk" of "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" and did not involve "tumultuous behavior." While Davis's conduct was inappropriate and intemperate, it was not criminal under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2. Consequently, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the charges against Davis.

Reversed.