anti-stalking statute State v. Fareed M. Gandhi (A-101-08) 2-23-10
The jury charge in this case was not erroneous because
New Jersey’s anti-stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10,
reaches and punishes one who purposefully or knowingly
engages in a course of stalking conduct that would
cause a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or
death. The statutory offense applies even if the
defendant is operating under the motivation of an
obsessed and disturbed love the purportedly obscures
appreciation of the terror that his or her conduct
would reasonably cause to the victim.
February 26, 2010
February 9, 2010
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DASHAWN MILLER A-3094-08T
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DASHAWN MILLER
A-3094-08T4 2-09-10
Defendant's trial on charges of robbery of two victims,
burglary and related weapons offenses was conducted in a
courtroom in which the record is videotaped. During the course
of deliberations, the jurors asked to hear the testimony of one
of the victims again. The trial judge arranged for the jury to
view the video in open court and in the presence of defendant,
both counsel and the judge. The jury ultimately found defendant
guilty of the crimes, and the judge sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of twenty-eight years, which is comprised of two
fourteen-year terms for first-degree robbery and concurrent
sentences for the remaining convictions.
In rejecting defendant's claim of prejudice from the replay
of the videotaped testimony, we assess the potential for
prejudice in light of the options available to the judge. And,
in affirming his sentence, we apply the standard of review set
forth in State v. Bieniek and State v. Cassady.
A-3094-08T4 2-09-10
Defendant's trial on charges of robbery of two victims,
burglary and related weapons offenses was conducted in a
courtroom in which the record is videotaped. During the course
of deliberations, the jurors asked to hear the testimony of one
of the victims again. The trial judge arranged for the jury to
view the video in open court and in the presence of defendant,
both counsel and the judge. The jury ultimately found defendant
guilty of the crimes, and the judge sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of twenty-eight years, which is comprised of two
fourteen-year terms for first-degree robbery and concurrent
sentences for the remaining convictions.
In rejecting defendant's claim of prejudice from the replay
of the videotaped testimony, we assess the potential for
prejudice in light of the options available to the judge. And,
in affirming his sentence, we apply the standard of review set
forth in State v. Bieniek and State v. Cassady.
STATE V. JASON LEWIS and JEROME LEWIS A-2066-08T4
STATE V. JASON LEWIS and JEROME LEWIS
A-2066-08T4 02-08-10
Where police stopped vehicle at night in a neighborhood
known for drug sales based on evidence providing probable cause
to believe vehicle contained drugs, persons other than the
occupants who also had reason to believe the vehicle contained
drugs may have had access to the vehicle, and there was a
substantial question whether other police officers would have
been available to detain the occupants while an application was
made for a warrant, the State established the exigent
circumstances required to justify a search of the vehicle under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover,
the validity of the search was not affected by the fact that
drugs were found in a closed leather case because, when the
automobile exception applies, the police may search every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search.
A-2066-08T4 02-08-10
Where police stopped vehicle at night in a neighborhood
known for drug sales based on evidence providing probable cause
to believe vehicle contained drugs, persons other than the
occupants who also had reason to believe the vehicle contained
drugs may have had access to the vehicle, and there was a
substantial question whether other police officers would have
been available to detain the occupants while an application was
made for a warrant, the State established the exigent
circumstances required to justify a search of the vehicle under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover,
the validity of the search was not affected by the fact that
drugs were found in a closed leather case because, when the
automobile exception applies, the police may search every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search.
State v. Thomas Best (A-77-08) 2-3-10
State v. Thomas Best (A-77-08) 2-3-10
A school administrator need only satisfy the lesser
reasonable grounds standard rather than the probable
cause standard to search a student’s vehicle parked on
school property.
A school administrator need only satisfy the lesser
reasonable grounds standard rather than the probable
cause standard to search a student’s vehicle parked on
school property.
January 10, 2010
New trial ordered where Judge conducted questioning of defense expert State v. O’Brien __ NJ __ (A-89-08)
New trial ordered where Judge conducted questioning of defense expert
State v. O’Brien __ NJ __ (A-89-08) 12-29-09
Defendant was entitled to face a single adversary, the State. He should not have had to bear the consequences of a judge who appeared to disbelieve him and his expert witness, revealed that disbelief to the jury, and supported a witness adverse to him. Because that conduct was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, a new trial is in order.
State v. O’Brien __ NJ __ (A-89-08) 12-29-09
Defendant was entitled to face a single adversary, the State. He should not have had to bear the consequences of a judge who appeared to disbelieve him and his expert witness, revealed that disbelief to the jury, and supported a witness adverse to him. Because that conduct was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, a new trial is in order.
State v Ciancaglini __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2010) A-2785-08T4
State v Ciancaglini __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2010)
A-2785-08T4 01-07-10
In this appeal from a DWI conviction, after prior separate DWI and refusal convictions, this Appellate panel disagree with the holding of State v. DiSomma, 262 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 1993), and hold that the prior refusal conviction does count toward making this a third offense. Our holding is consistent with a line of cases both before and after DiSomma concluding that a prior DWI conviction counts toward enhancement of the sentence imposed for a refusal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Tekel, 281 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1995). The court also held that double jeopardy does not bar reinstatement of the sentence originally imposed in the municipal court for a third DWI offense, which was reduced in the Law Division to a sentence for a first DWI offense.
A-2785-08T4 01-07-10
In this appeal from a DWI conviction, after prior separate DWI and refusal convictions, this Appellate panel disagree with the holding of State v. DiSomma, 262 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 1993), and hold that the prior refusal conviction does count toward making this a third offense. Our holding is consistent with a line of cases both before and after DiSomma concluding that a prior DWI conviction counts toward enhancement of the sentence imposed for a refusal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Tekel, 281 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1995). The court also held that double jeopardy does not bar reinstatement of the sentence originally imposed in the municipal court for a third DWI offense, which was reduced in the Law Division to a sentence for a first DWI offense.
December 30, 2009
State v. Peter O’Brien (A-89-08)
State v. Peter O’Brien (A-89-08)
12-29-09
Defendant was entitled to face a single adversary, the
State. He should not have had to bear the
consequences of a judge who appeared to disbelieve him
and his expert witness, revealed that disbelief to the
jury, and supported a witness adverse to him. Because
that conduct was clearly capable of producing an
unjust result, a new trial is in order. However, the
trial judge’s refusal to provide the jury with written
instructions did not constitute plain error and
therefore does not warrant reversal.
12-29-09
Defendant was entitled to face a single adversary, the
State. He should not have had to bear the
consequences of a judge who appeared to disbelieve him
and his expert witness, revealed that disbelief to the
jury, and supported a witness adverse to him. Because
that conduct was clearly capable of producing an
unjust result, a new trial is in order. However, the
trial judge’s refusal to provide the jury with written
instructions did not constitute plain error and
therefore does not warrant reversal.
State v. Richard Chippero (A-50-08)
State v. Richard Chippero (A-50-08) 12-29-09
Although the evidence that justifies both an arrest
and the issuance of a search warrant must support a
finding of probable cause, the two probable cause
determinations are not identical. A finding of
probable cause as to one does not mean that probable
cause as to the other must follow, nor does the lack
of one compel a finding of the lack of proof for the
other. Accordingly, nothing in the Supreme Court’s
earlier holding in this case (Chippero I) should be
perceived as having compelled the suppression of the
evidence seized from defendant’s home.
Although the evidence that justifies both an arrest
and the issuance of a search warrant must support a
finding of probable cause, the two probable cause
determinations are not identical. A finding of
probable cause as to one does not mean that probable
cause as to the other must follow, nor does the lack
of one compel a finding of the lack of proof for the
other. Accordingly, nothing in the Supreme Court’s
earlier holding in this case (Chippero I) should be
perceived as having compelled the suppression of the
evidence seized from defendant’s home.
December 16, 2009
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. STEVEN MUSTARO A-2582-08T
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. STEVEN MUSTARO
A-2582-08T4 12-14-09
We consider defendant's appeal from the denial of a post-
sentence motion to vacate his plea of guilty to driving while
intoxicated. The motion was predicated on a claim that the
State withheld exculpatory evidence, but by the time the motion
was filed the evidence — a videotape recorded by the camera in
the arresting officer's patrol car — had been destroyed through
reuse in accordance with the police department's procedures.
Applying State v. Parsons, 341 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2001)
and State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 107-09 (1991), we conclude
that defendant failed to establish that he would not have
admitted to driving if he had access to the videotape prior to
the plea, and we further conclude that the denial of his motion
was fully consistent with a proper application of the principles
set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
A-2582-08T4 12-14-09
We consider defendant's appeal from the denial of a post-
sentence motion to vacate his plea of guilty to driving while
intoxicated. The motion was predicated on a claim that the
State withheld exculpatory evidence, but by the time the motion
was filed the evidence — a videotape recorded by the camera in
the arresting officer's patrol car — had been destroyed through
reuse in accordance with the police department's procedures.
Applying State v. Parsons, 341 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2001)
and State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 107-09 (1991), we conclude
that defendant failed to establish that he would not have
admitted to driving if he had access to the videotape prior to
the plea, and we further conclude that the denial of his motion
was fully consistent with a proper application of the principles
set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. R.T. A-1131-06T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. R.T.
A-1131-06T4
12-16-09
The majority reversed defendant's conviction for multiple
counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and one count
of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child finding
defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the court
charging the jury with intoxication as possibly negating an
element of the crime, over defense counsel's objection. The
facts in evidence do not clearly indicate a rational basis for
the conclusion that defendant suffered such a "prostration of
faculties" as to render him incapable of forming the requisite
mental state to commit the crimes and the instruction interfered
with defense counsel's stated trial strategy.
The dissent found the trial court's discretion to give a
"road map" instruction on voluntary intoxication is not limited
to cases in which the charge is "clearly indicated" by the
evidence. Since the charge did not have the capacity to lead to
an unjust result here, the trial court did not commit reversible
error in giving the charge.
A-1131-06T4
12-16-09
The majority reversed defendant's conviction for multiple
counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and one count
of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child finding
defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the court
charging the jury with intoxication as possibly negating an
element of the crime, over defense counsel's objection. The
facts in evidence do not clearly indicate a rational basis for
the conclusion that defendant suffered such a "prostration of
faculties" as to render him incapable of forming the requisite
mental state to commit the crimes and the instruction interfered
with defense counsel's stated trial strategy.
The dissent found the trial court's discretion to give a
"road map" instruction on voluntary intoxication is not limited
to cases in which the charge is "clearly indicated" by the
evidence. Since the charge did not have the capacity to lead to
an unjust result here, the trial court did not commit reversible
error in giving the charge.
STATE VS. CHRISTOS E. TSETSEKAS A-1832-08T4
STATE VS. CHRISTOS E. TSETSEKAS
A-1832-08T4 12-14-09
We reversed the Law Division conviction and required
dismissal of the DWI charge due to violation of defendant's
right to a speedy trial. The extensive delay in adjudicating
this matter, caused solely by the State's repeated lapses in
preparation and the failure to secure its witnesses, infringed
upon defendant's due process rights.
A-1832-08T4 12-14-09
We reversed the Law Division conviction and required
dismissal of the DWI charge due to violation of defendant's
right to a speedy trial. The extensive delay in adjudicating
this matter, caused solely by the State's repeated lapses in
preparation and the failure to secure its witnesses, infringed
upon defendant's due process rights.
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