BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION V. CHRIS CHRISTIE, GOVERNOR OF
THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
A-2871-09T2/A-2996-09T2/A-2997-09T2 (consolidated)
05-07-10
Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 7, 42 N.J.R. 580(b)
(January 20, 2010) ("EO 7"), which seeks to extend "pay-to-play"
restrictions on political campaign contributions to labor
organizations, violates principles of separation of powers under
article III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.
In particular, EO 7's intended treatment of collective
bargaining agreements as "contracts" and labor unions as
"business entities" is fundamentally incompatible with existing
laws and statutes, and thus impermissibly encroaches upon lawmaking
powers delegated by the people to the Legislature under
the 1947 Constitution.
The provision is invalidated, effective July 1, 2010,
without prejudice to the future potential adoption of
appropriate legislation enacting pay-to-play reforms covering
labor organizations, in a manner consistent with or amending, as
necessary, existing laws.
May 12, 2010
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. ORION T. BRABHAM A-3571-07T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. ORION T. BRABHAM
A-3571-07T4 4-30-10
Defendant primarily objects to the denial of his motion to
suppress statements he made to New Jersey law enforcement
officers after he was incarcerated for a parole violation in New
York. Accepting the judge's factual findings, we conclude that
the statements, which the judge found were made during a meeting
defendant requested to negotiate a plea, should have been
excluded pursuant to N.J.R.E. 410.
A-3571-07T4 4-30-10
Defendant primarily objects to the denial of his motion to
suppress statements he made to New Jersey law enforcement
officers after he was incarcerated for a parole violation in New
York. Accepting the judge's factual findings, we conclude that
the statements, which the judge found were made during a meeting
defendant requested to negotiate a plea, should have been
excluded pursuant to N.J.R.E. 410.
State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09)
State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09) 5-6-10
The officers presented sufficient facts in the
totality of the circumstances that would create in a
police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by
ordering the passenger to exit the car. Those same
circumstances authorize a police officer to open a
5-6-10 State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09)
The officers presented sufficient facts in the
totality of the circumstances that would create in a
police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by
ordering the passenger to exit the car. Those same
circumstances authorize a police officer to open a
vehicle door as part of ordering a passenger to exit.
Thus, the seizure of the weapon was proper under the
plain view doctrine, and the seizure of the holster
and loaded magazine from the passenger was lawful as the fruits of a proper search incident to an arrest.
The officers presented sufficient facts in the
totality of the circumstances that would create in a
police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by
ordering the passenger to exit the car. Those same
circumstances authorize a police officer to open a
5-6-10 State v. Danny Mai (A-98-09)
The officers presented sufficient facts in the
totality of the circumstances that would create in a
police officer a heightened awareness of danger that
would warrant an objectively reasonable officer in
securing the scene in a more effective manner by
ordering the passenger to exit the car. Those same
circumstances authorize a police officer to open a
vehicle door as part of ordering a passenger to exit.
Thus, the seizure of the weapon was proper under the
plain view doctrine, and the seizure of the holster
and loaded magazine from the passenger was lawful as the fruits of a proper search incident to an arrest.
State v. Duane Kelly (A-24-09)
State v. Duane Kelly (A-24-09) 5-4-10
The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate
Division upholding defendant’s murder, felony-murder,
and armed-robbery convictions. Defendant’s second
trial was not barred by the principles of collateral
estoppel, which are incorporated in the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Because of the seemingly
inconsistent verdicts in the first trial, defendant
cannot establish that the jury determined an ultimate
fact that precluded a retrial of the reversed
convictions. Moreover, even if the verdicts were not
inconsistent, the Court would not be inclined to apply
the constitutional-equitable doctrine of collateral
estoppel when the ultimate issue defendant seeks to
preclude from relitigation is one that might well have
been founded on a defense witness’s perjured
testimony, testimony that tainted both the acquittals
and convictions in the first tria
The Court affirms the judgment of the Appellate
Division upholding defendant’s murder, felony-murder,
and armed-robbery convictions. Defendant’s second
trial was not barred by the principles of collateral
estoppel, which are incorporated in the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Because of the seemingly
inconsistent verdicts in the first trial, defendant
cannot establish that the jury determined an ultimate
fact that precluded a retrial of the reversed
convictions. Moreover, even if the verdicts were not
inconsistent, the Court would not be inclined to apply
the constitutional-equitable doctrine of collateral
estoppel when the ultimate issue defendant seeks to
preclude from relitigation is one that might well have
been founded on a defense witness’s perjured
testimony, testimony that tainted both the acquittals
and convictions in the first tria
May 5, 2010
State v. Frank Dellisanti (A-29-09)
State v. Frank Dellisanti (A-29-09) 4-27-10
The arrest of defendant Frank Dellisanti for a
probation violation during jury deliberations in his
unrelated criminal trial violated his right under Rule
3:16(b) to be present through the trial’s conclusion
and the rendering of the verdict. Because the record
does not establish that the Rule’s conditions for
waiver were satisfied, the Court reverses Dellisanti’s
convictions and remands for a new trial.
The arrest of defendant Frank Dellisanti for a
probation violation during jury deliberations in his
unrelated criminal trial violated his right under Rule
3:16(b) to be present through the trial’s conclusion
and the rendering of the verdict. Because the record
does not establish that the Rule’s conditions for
waiver were satisfied, the Court reverses Dellisanti’s
convictions and remands for a new trial.
STATE v. KARL LESTER MURPHY (A-3693-08T4)
TATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KARL LESTER MURPHY A-3693-08T4
We held that the trial judge's rulings, authorizing the
State to use a seventeen-year-old prior conviction to impeach
defendant's credibility and permitting the prosecutor to argue
that a testifying police officer had no incentive to lie,
deprived defendant of his right to a fair trial. We agreed with
defendant's contention that the prosecutor's summation exceeded
the boundaries of legitimate advocacy when she vouched for the
credibility of her witness. We likewise agreed with defendant's
claim that because he had no intervening convictions, this
seventeen-year-old conviction was so stale that its probative
value was vastly outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and the
judge therefore erred by permitting the State to use it to
impeach his credibility. In this trial, where the State's
proofs were far from overwheerrors harmless.
We held that the trial judge's rulings, authorizing the
State to use a seventeen-year-old prior conviction to impeach
defendant's credibility and permitting the prosecutor to argue
that a testifying police officer had no incentive to lie,
deprived defendant of his right to a fair trial. We agreed with
defendant's contention that the prosecutor's summation exceeded
the boundaries of legitimate advocacy when she vouched for the
credibility of her witness. We likewise agreed with defendant's
claim that because he had no intervening convictions, this
seventeen-year-old conviction was so stale that its probative
value was vastly outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and the
judge therefore erred by permitting the State to use it to
impeach his credibility. In this trial, where the State's
proofs were far from overwheerrors harmless.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. E.W. A-0146-08T4 (4-27-10)
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. E.W. A-0146-08T4 (4-27-10)
We held that defendant was entitled to post-conviction
relief consisting of vacation of an illegal sentence when
evidence demonstrated that defendant had committed a sexual
assault on a juvenile in 1979 when the statute of limitations
for the offense was five years, the statute of limitations on
the offense had expired prior to the amendment of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
6 in 1986 to exempt sexual assault from the five-year bar, and
defendant was not indicted for the crime until 1991. Any
application of the 1986 version of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 to preserve
the claim against defendant violated the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause, and thus both his conviction and sentence were
illegal.
We held that defendant was entitled to post-conviction
relief consisting of vacation of an illegal sentence when
evidence demonstrated that defendant had committed a sexual
assault on a juvenile in 1979 when the statute of limitations
for the offense was five years, the statute of limitations on
the offense had expired prior to the amendment of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
6 in 1986 to exempt sexual assault from the five-year bar, and
defendant was not indicted for the crime until 1991. Any
application of the 1986 version of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 to preserve
the claim against defendant violated the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause, and thus both his conviction and sentence were
illegal.
April 16, 2010
STATE v. GERMAINE A. HANDY (A-1838-07T4)
STATE v. GERMAINE A. HANDY (A-1838-07T4) 04-12-10
This appeal required us to determine whether evidence found
during the search incident to defendant's arrest should have
been suppressed because the dispatcher who incorrectly informed
the arresting officer that there was an outstanding arrest
warrant acted unreasonably under the circumstances, even though
the conduct of the arresting officer himself was reasonable.
The warrant at issue, which was ten years old at the time, had
the same birth month, but a different birth day and year. The
first name on the warrant was a variant spelling of defendant’s
first name. We concluded that suppression is required and,
consequently, reversed the conviction.
This appeal required us to determine whether evidence found
during the search incident to defendant's arrest should have
been suppressed because the dispatcher who incorrectly informed
the arresting officer that there was an outstanding arrest
warrant acted unreasonably under the circumstances, even though
the conduct of the arresting officer himself was reasonable.
The warrant at issue, which was ten years old at the time, had
the same birth month, but a different birth day and year. The
first name on the warrant was a variant spelling of defendant’s
first name. We concluded that suppression is required and,
consequently, reversed the conviction.
April 14, 2010
State of New Jersey v. J.G. (A-44-08)
State of New Jersey v. J.G. (A-44-08) 4-7-10
The cleric-penitent privilege applies when, under the
totality of the circumstances, an objectively
reasonable penitent would believe that a communication
was secret, that is, made in confidence to a cleric in
the cleric’s professional character or role as a
spiritual advisor.
The cleric-penitent privilege applies when, under the
totality of the circumstances, an objectively
reasonable penitent would believe that a communication
was secret, that is, made in confidence to a cleric in
the cleric’s professional character or role as a
spiritual advisor.
New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. M.C. III In the Matter of M.C. IV and N.C. (A-96/97-08)
New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v.
M.C. III
In the Matter of M.C. IV and N.C. (A-96/97-08)
3-31-10
The trial court’s findings of abuse and neglect in
this case were supported by sufficient evidence,
defendant M.C. is barred by the doctrine of invited
error from contesting on appeal the admission of
documents that were admitted into evidence with his
express consent, and the trial court did not err in
relying on those documents.
M.C. III
In the Matter of M.C. IV and N.C. (A-96/97-08)
3-31-10
The trial court’s findings of abuse and neglect in
this case were supported by sufficient evidence,
defendant M.C. is barred by the doctrine of invited
error from contesting on appeal the admission of
documents that were admitted into evidence with his
express consent, and the trial court did not err in
relying on those documents.
State of New Jersey in the Interest of C.V. (A-6-09)
State of New Jersey in the Interest of C.V. (A-6-09) 3-22-10
The Supreme Court has no disagreement with the
Appellate Division’s unassailable determination that
C.V.’s placements in YCS and VisionQuest do not
satisfy the intended concept of detention in Rule
5:21-3(e) to qualify for mandatory day-to-day credit.
In addition, the Court holds that the Family Part
court retains the flexibility, in appropriate cases,
to grant a probationer who violated or otherwise
imperfectly performed the conditions of probation any
sentence the court could have initially imposed.
The Supreme Court has no disagreement with the
Appellate Division’s unassailable determination that
C.V.’s placements in YCS and VisionQuest do not
satisfy the intended concept of detention in Rule
5:21-3(e) to qualify for mandatory day-to-day credit.
In addition, the Court holds that the Family Part
court retains the flexibility, in appropriate cases,
to grant a probationer who violated or otherwise
imperfectly performed the conditions of probation any
sentence the court could have initially imposed.
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