COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 1034 V. NEW
JERSEY STATE POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, LOCAL
203 AND BURLINGTON COUNTY
A-1394-08T1 03-11-10
N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 prohibits policemen from joining "an
employee organization that admits employees other than policemen
to membership." We conclude that the Public Employment
Relations Commission (PERC) exceeded its statutory authority by
adopting a per se rule that Burlington County weights and
measures supervisors and apprentices are "policemen" within the
intendment of this statute solely because of those employees'
statutory authority to arrest "on the violation of any of the
provisions" of the weights and measures law "within [their] view
or presence." N.J.S.A. 51:1-106. We disapprove the per se rule
adopted by PERC in In re County of Warren, 12 NJPER 357 (¶17134
1986), and remand to PERC for further consideration in light of
County of Gloucester v. Public Employment Relations Commission,
107 N.J. Super. 150
March 11, 2010
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF T.M. A-4897-08T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF T.M.
A-4897-08T4 03-08-10
This short opinion serves as a reminder to Family Part
judges that a hearing to determine waiver of a juvenile for
adult prosecution of a designated serious charge does not
involve weighing the evidence to determine guilt or innocence
but only whether the State has probable cause to charge the
juvenile.
A-4897-08T4 03-08-10
This short opinion serves as a reminder to Family Part
judges that a hearing to determine waiver of a juvenile for
adult prosecution of a designated serious charge does not
involve weighing the evidence to determine guilt or innocence
but only whether the State has probable cause to charge the
juvenile.
RONEN SHIMONI V. N.J. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS A-1408-08T1
RONEN SHIMONI V. N.J. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
A-1408-08T1 03-05-10
Denial by the Commissioner of Corrections of an inmate's
application to serve the remainder of his sentence in the
country of his citizenship is not subject to the usual standard
of judicial review, i.e. whether it was arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. Considering that inmates have no constitutionally
protected liberty interest in an international transfer and
given the broad powers statutorily invested in the Commissioner,
denial of such an application will not be reversed absent proof
that it was made with malicious intent or on a constitutionally
impermissible basis, such as race, religion, or national origin.
A-1408-08T1 03-05-10
Denial by the Commissioner of Corrections of an inmate's
application to serve the remainder of his sentence in the
country of his citizenship is not subject to the usual standard
of judicial review, i.e. whether it was arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. Considering that inmates have no constitutionally
protected liberty interest in an international transfer and
given the broad powers statutorily invested in the Commissioner,
denial of such an application will not be reversed absent proof
that it was made with malicious intent or on a constitutionally
impermissible basis, such as race, religion, or national origin.
RAHGEAM JENKINS v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS A-1220-08T3
RAHGEAM JENKINS v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
A-1220-08T3 03-05-10
Prison disciplinary regulation prohibiting the possession
of "anything related to a security threat group" is not
unconstitutionally vague and provides fair warning of prohibited
conduct. The court's review of the record, which included a
gang investigator's identification of gang-related terms in
seized letters and reasons, supported a finding that possession
of these letters was prohibited.
A-1220-08T3 03-05-10
Prison disciplinary regulation prohibiting the possession
of "anything related to a security threat group" is not
unconstitutionally vague and provides fair warning of prohibited
conduct. The court's review of the record, which included a
gang investigator's identification of gang-related terms in
seized letters and reasons, supported a finding that possession
of these letters was prohibited.
State v. Jason V. Broom-Smith (A-3-09)
State v. Jason V. Broom-Smith (A-3-09) 3-9-10
The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s
determination that N.J.S.A. 2B:12-6 and Rule 1:12-3,
which address the designation of judges, were broad
enough to authorize the Berkeley Township municipal
judge to issue the search warrant for defendant’s
house in Dover Township under the circumstances
presented in this case.
The Court affirms the Appellate Division’s
determination that N.J.S.A. 2B:12-6 and Rule 1:12-3,
which address the designation of judges, were broad
enough to authorize the Berkeley Township municipal
judge to issue the search warrant for defendant’s
house in Dover Township under the circumstances
presented in this case.
February 26, 2010
anti-stalking statute State v. Fareed M. Gandhi (A-101-08)
anti-stalking statute State v. Fareed M. Gandhi (A-101-08) 2-23-10
The jury charge in this case was not erroneous because
New Jersey’s anti-stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10,
reaches and punishes one who purposefully or knowingly
engages in a course of stalking conduct that would
cause a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or
death. The statutory offense applies even if the
defendant is operating under the motivation of an
obsessed and disturbed love the purportedly obscures
appreciation of the terror that his or her conduct
would reasonably cause to the victim.
The jury charge in this case was not erroneous because
New Jersey’s anti-stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10,
reaches and punishes one who purposefully or knowingly
engages in a course of stalking conduct that would
cause a reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or
death. The statutory offense applies even if the
defendant is operating under the motivation of an
obsessed and disturbed love the purportedly obscures
appreciation of the terror that his or her conduct
would reasonably cause to the victim.
February 9, 2010
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DASHAWN MILLER A-3094-08T
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DASHAWN MILLER
A-3094-08T4 2-09-10
Defendant's trial on charges of robbery of two victims,
burglary and related weapons offenses was conducted in a
courtroom in which the record is videotaped. During the course
of deliberations, the jurors asked to hear the testimony of one
of the victims again. The trial judge arranged for the jury to
view the video in open court and in the presence of defendant,
both counsel and the judge. The jury ultimately found defendant
guilty of the crimes, and the judge sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of twenty-eight years, which is comprised of two
fourteen-year terms for first-degree robbery and concurrent
sentences for the remaining convictions.
In rejecting defendant's claim of prejudice from the replay
of the videotaped testimony, we assess the potential for
prejudice in light of the options available to the judge. And,
in affirming his sentence, we apply the standard of review set
forth in State v. Bieniek and State v. Cassady.
A-3094-08T4 2-09-10
Defendant's trial on charges of robbery of two victims,
burglary and related weapons offenses was conducted in a
courtroom in which the record is videotaped. During the course
of deliberations, the jurors asked to hear the testimony of one
of the victims again. The trial judge arranged for the jury to
view the video in open court and in the presence of defendant,
both counsel and the judge. The jury ultimately found defendant
guilty of the crimes, and the judge sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of twenty-eight years, which is comprised of two
fourteen-year terms for first-degree robbery and concurrent
sentences for the remaining convictions.
In rejecting defendant's claim of prejudice from the replay
of the videotaped testimony, we assess the potential for
prejudice in light of the options available to the judge. And,
in affirming his sentence, we apply the standard of review set
forth in State v. Bieniek and State v. Cassady.
STATE V. JASON LEWIS and JEROME LEWIS A-2066-08T4
STATE V. JASON LEWIS and JEROME LEWIS
A-2066-08T4 02-08-10
Where police stopped vehicle at night in a neighborhood
known for drug sales based on evidence providing probable cause
to believe vehicle contained drugs, persons other than the
occupants who also had reason to believe the vehicle contained
drugs may have had access to the vehicle, and there was a
substantial question whether other police officers would have
been available to detain the occupants while an application was
made for a warrant, the State established the exigent
circumstances required to justify a search of the vehicle under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover,
the validity of the search was not affected by the fact that
drugs were found in a closed leather case because, when the
automobile exception applies, the police may search every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search.
A-2066-08T4 02-08-10
Where police stopped vehicle at night in a neighborhood
known for drug sales based on evidence providing probable cause
to believe vehicle contained drugs, persons other than the
occupants who also had reason to believe the vehicle contained
drugs may have had access to the vehicle, and there was a
substantial question whether other police officers would have
been available to detain the occupants while an application was
made for a warrant, the State established the exigent
circumstances required to justify a search of the vehicle under
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover,
the validity of the search was not affected by the fact that
drugs were found in a closed leather case because, when the
automobile exception applies, the police may search every part
of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of
the search.
State v. Thomas Best (A-77-08) 2-3-10
State v. Thomas Best (A-77-08) 2-3-10
A school administrator need only satisfy the lesser
reasonable grounds standard rather than the probable
cause standard to search a student’s vehicle parked on
school property.
A school administrator need only satisfy the lesser
reasonable grounds standard rather than the probable
cause standard to search a student’s vehicle parked on
school property.
January 10, 2010
New trial ordered where Judge conducted questioning of defense expert State v. O’Brien __ NJ __ (A-89-08)
New trial ordered where Judge conducted questioning of defense expert
State v. O’Brien __ NJ __ (A-89-08) 12-29-09
Defendant was entitled to face a single adversary, the State. He should not have had to bear the consequences of a judge who appeared to disbelieve him and his expert witness, revealed that disbelief to the jury, and supported a witness adverse to him. Because that conduct was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, a new trial is in order.
State v. O’Brien __ NJ __ (A-89-08) 12-29-09
Defendant was entitled to face a single adversary, the State. He should not have had to bear the consequences of a judge who appeared to disbelieve him and his expert witness, revealed that disbelief to the jury, and supported a witness adverse to him. Because that conduct was clearly capable of producing an unjust result, a new trial is in order.
State v Ciancaglini __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2010) A-2785-08T4
State v Ciancaglini __ NJ Super. __ (App. Div. 2010)
A-2785-08T4 01-07-10
In this appeal from a DWI conviction, after prior separate DWI and refusal convictions, this Appellate panel disagree with the holding of State v. DiSomma, 262 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 1993), and hold that the prior refusal conviction does count toward making this a third offense. Our holding is consistent with a line of cases both before and after DiSomma concluding that a prior DWI conviction counts toward enhancement of the sentence imposed for a refusal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Tekel, 281 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1995). The court also held that double jeopardy does not bar reinstatement of the sentence originally imposed in the municipal court for a third DWI offense, which was reduced in the Law Division to a sentence for a first DWI offense.
A-2785-08T4 01-07-10
In this appeal from a DWI conviction, after prior separate DWI and refusal convictions, this Appellate panel disagree with the holding of State v. DiSomma, 262 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 1993), and hold that the prior refusal conviction does count toward making this a third offense. Our holding is consistent with a line of cases both before and after DiSomma concluding that a prior DWI conviction counts toward enhancement of the sentence imposed for a refusal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Tekel, 281 N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1995). The court also held that double jeopardy does not bar reinstatement of the sentence originally imposed in the municipal court for a third DWI offense, which was reduced in the Law Division to a sentence for a first DWI offense.
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