State v. Wendell Mann (A-56-09)

State v. Wendell Mann (A-56-09) 8-4-10

The trial court fairly concluded that the police had

reasonable and articulable suspicion to support an

investigatory stop of defendant and that the seizure

of drugs from both locations was lawful.

State v. Jeremiah Hupka (A-36-09)

State v. Jeremiah Hupka (A-36-09) 8-3-10

The State’s demand for permanent disqualification was

not supported on this record; the offense to which

Hupka pled does not compel his forfeiture of office

and permanent disqualification under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2.

Roy M. Victor v. State of New Jersey (A-2-09)

Roy M. Victor v. State of New Jersey (A-2-09) 9-13-10

The Court concurs in the Appellate Division’s judgment

that the verdict must be reversed and the matter

remanded for a new trial. The Court does so because,

regardless of whether or not there is room in the Law

Against Discrimination’s strong protective embrace of

persons with disabilities to recognize that there may

be circumstances in which a failure to accommodate in

and of itself gives rise to a cause of action, this

plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate cannot

meet the proofs required on his prima facie case.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. PETER TRIESTMAN A-6408-08T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. PETER TRIESTMAN

A-6408-08T4 09-10-10

We dismissed an indictment charging defendant with fourth-

degree sexual contact because the prosecutor failed to correctly

read and reference statutory sexual offenses when the grand jury

was convened on September 23, 2008. The mistakes in the charge

left the grand jury with no idea of which portions of N.J.S.A.

2C:14-2 were incorporated by reference into N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b,

which defendant was ultimately charged with violating. This was

compounded with the passage of eleven weeks before the

prosecutor presented defendant's case, at which time she

provided no further written or oral charge to the jury. We

referred this matter to the Criminal Practice Committee.

Defendant also sought dismissal of the indictment on the

ground that the statute requires physical force in addition to

mere sexual contact. He urges there was no evidence of any

physical force, negating an indictment under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3b.

We rejected this argument because the Supreme Court in State v.

M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 444 (1992), unequivocally stated that it

was "hardly possible" that the Legislature in enacting N.J.S.A.

2C:14-3 "wanted to decriminalize unauthorized sexual intrusions

on the bodily integrity of a victim by requiring a showing of

force in addition to that entailed in the sexual contact

itself."

STATE V. JAMES J. MAUTI A-3023-09T4

STATE V. JAMES J. MAUTI

A-3023-09T4 09-08-10

In this appeal, we determine that the spousal privilege in

N.J.R.E. 501(2) cannot be pierced by applying the factors

outlined by the Court in In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 243-44

(1979).

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. ALNESHA MINITEE AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DARNELL BLAND A-5002-06T4/A-6213-06T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. ALNESHA MINITEE AND

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DARNELL BLAND

A-5002-06T4/A-6213-06T4

08-16-10(consolidated)

In these back-to-back appeals concerning the warrantless

search of a motor vehicle, we harmonize the seemingly

inconsistent holdings in State v. Martin, 87 N.J. 561 (1981) and

State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), by finding that the

exigent circumstances that existed at the scene only permitted

the police to seize the vehicle. Under our State's

Constitution, once impounded, the police were required to obtain

a warrant before searching the vehicle.

We also construe the United States Supreme Court's opinion

in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S. Ct. 1975,

1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428 (1970), permitting warrantless

searches of vehicles impounded by the police, to constitute

binding authority only under the Fourth Amendment.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. QUINN M. LATNEY A-6208-

STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. QUINN M. LATNEY

A-6208-06T4 08-06-10

We consider defendant's objection to a flight instruction,

and conclude the instruction was unwarranted and that the

evidence of flight should not have been admitted at trial.

Defendant was on trial for robbery and related crimes. Two days

before the robbery defendant had stolen a car from a dealership,

and the day following the robbery, defendant was pursued by the

police while driving the stolen car. He pled guilty to theft of

the car prior to this trial.

The State did not introduce evidence that the car was

stolen and neither did defendant. We conclude that under these

circumstances, the evidence of flight should have been excluded.

STATE v. JESSE J. LACEY A-4920-08T4

08-27-10 STATE v. JESSE J. LACEY A-4920-08T4
A DYFS proceeding is not a "civil proceeding" for purposes
of the evidentiary preclusion provision of Rule 3:9-2. Thus,
the trial court properly denied the preclusion of evidential use
of the plea.