DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DIVISION OF YOUTH
AND FAMILY SERVICES v. C.H. A-4786-08T1 07-28-10
An ALJ found that a parent's corporal punishment of a fouryear-
old who reported to a neighbor that there was no
electricity in their home was insufficient to sustain an
allegation of abuse under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c). The Director
disagreed, finding that given the reason for inflicting the
corporal punishment, the fact that the child was struck multiple
times, and the parent's history of questionable corporal
punishment, the abuse had been substantiated. We affirmed and
agreed the Director properly considered the parent's past
admitted history of corporal punishment inflicted upon the
child.
July 28, 2010
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DELORES RANDALL A-2495-08T4
07-26-10 STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. DELORES RANDALL
A-2495-08T4
A prosecutor may not condition a defendant's participation
in the pre-trial intervention (PTI) program upon an agreement by
the defendant to plead guilty. Here the prosecutor erred in
doing so. However, the denial of participation in PTI is
upheld, nonetheless, because defendant had been violently and
directly combative with a law enforcement officer and yet failed
to acknowledge any responsibility for her conduct, claiming she
had been passive despite a contradictory video. Since the
program may not be effective for people who refuse to accept any
responsibility for their conduct, it was not an abuse of
discretion, under the circumstances here, for the prosecutor to
deny defendant participation in PTI.
A-2495-08T4
A prosecutor may not condition a defendant's participation
in the pre-trial intervention (PTI) program upon an agreement by
the defendant to plead guilty. Here the prosecutor erred in
doing so. However, the denial of participation in PTI is
upheld, nonetheless, because defendant had been violently and
directly combative with a law enforcement officer and yet failed
to acknowledge any responsibility for her conduct, claiming she
had been passive despite a contradictory video. Since the
program may not be effective for people who refuse to accept any
responsibility for their conduct, it was not an abuse of
discretion, under the circumstances here, for the prosecutor to
deny defendant participation in PTI.
State of New Jersey v. Shem Walker (A-40-09)
State of New Jersey v. Shem Walker (A-40-09)7-28-10
Based on the evidence presented in the criminal trial in this matter, the trial court should have sua sponte charged the jury with the statutory affirmative defense to felony murder. However, because the jury’s findings negated most of the factors required to establish the affirmative defense, a new trial is not warranted.
Based on the evidence presented in the criminal trial in this matter, the trial court should have sua sponte charged the jury with the statutory affirmative defense to felony murder. However, because the jury’s findings negated most of the factors required to establish the affirmative defense, a new trial is not warranted.
July 21, 2010
State v. Johnnie Davila (A-20-09)
State v. Johnnie Davila (A-20-09) 7-14-10
A protective sweep conducted on private property is
not per se invalid merely because it does not occur
incident to an arrest. Law enforcement officers may
conduct a protective sweep only when (1) the officers
are lawfully within private premises for a legitimate
purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2)
the officers on the scene have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger. The sweep will
be upheld only if it is (1) conducted quickly, and (2)
restricted to areas where the person posing a danger
could hide. When an arrest is not the basis for entry,
the police must be able to point to dangerous
circumstances that developed once the officers were at the scene.
A protective sweep conducted on private property is
not per se invalid merely because it does not occur
incident to an arrest. Law enforcement officers may
conduct a protective sweep only when (1) the officers
are lawfully within private premises for a legitimate
purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2)
the officers on the scene have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger. The sweep will
be upheld only if it is (1) conducted quickly, and (2)
restricted to areas where the person posing a danger
could hide. When an arrest is not the basis for entry,
the police must be able to point to dangerous
circumstances that developed once the officers were at the scene.
State v. Johnnie Davila (A-20-09)
State v. Johnnie Davila (A-20-09) 7-14-10
A protective sweep conducted on private property is
not per se invalid merely because it does not occur
incident to an arrest. Law enforcement officers may
conduct a protective sweep only when (1) the officers
are lawfully within private premises for a legitimate
purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2)
the officers on the scene have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger. The sweep will
be upheld only if it is (1) conducted quickly, and (2)
restricted to areas where the person posing a danger
could hide. When an arrest is not the basis for entry,
the police must be able to point to dangerous
circumstances that developed once the officers were at the scene.
A protective sweep conducted on private property is
not per se invalid merely because it does not occur
incident to an arrest. Law enforcement officers may
conduct a protective sweep only when (1) the officers
are lawfully within private premises for a legitimate
purpose, which may include consent to enter; and (2)
the officers on the scene have a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the area to be swept
harbors an individual posing a danger. The sweep will
be upheld only if it is (1) conducted quickly, and (2)
restricted to areas where the person posing a danger
could hide. When an arrest is not the basis for entry,
the police must be able to point to dangerous
circumstances that developed once the officers were at the scene.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. PAUL A. FOGLIA A-6332-07T4
07-16-10 STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. PAUL A. FOGLIA A-6332-07T4
We reversed defendant's murder conviction based upon the
wholesale admission of "bad act" evidence, which was admitted
without any limiting instructions from the judge. We rejected
the various grounds for admissibility asserted by the State,
concluding that much of the evidence was irrelevant under the
first prong of the Cofield test.
In particular, we rejected the State's argument that the
evidence was admissible to rebut defendant's asserted
"passion/provocation manslaughter" defense.
We reversed defendant's murder conviction based upon the
wholesale admission of "bad act" evidence, which was admitted
without any limiting instructions from the judge. We rejected
the various grounds for admissibility asserted by the State,
concluding that much of the evidence was irrelevant under the
first prong of the Cofield test.
In particular, we rejected the State's argument that the
evidence was admissible to rebut defendant's asserted
"passion/provocation manslaughter" defense.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. PAUL A. FOGLIA A-6332-07T4
07-16-10 STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. PAUL A. FOGLIA A-6332-07T4
We reversed defendant's murder conviction based upon the
wholesale admission of "bad act" evidence, which was admitted
without any limiting instructions from the judge. We rejected
the various grounds for admissibility asserted by the State,
concluding that much of the evidence was irrelevant under the
first prong of the Cofield test.
In particular, we rejected the State's argument that the
evidence was admissible to rebut defendant's asserted
"passion/provocation manslaughter" defense.
We reversed defendant's murder conviction based upon the
wholesale admission of "bad act" evidence, which was admitted
without any limiting instructions from the judge. We rejected
the various grounds for admissibility asserted by the State,
concluding that much of the evidence was irrelevant under the
first prong of the Cofield test.
In particular, we rejected the State's argument that the
evidence was admissible to rebut defendant's asserted
"passion/provocation manslaughter" defense.
IN THE MATTER OF ARTHUR C. SNELLBAKER A-1443-09T2
IN THE MATTER OF ARTHUR C. SNELLBAKER A-1443-09T2 07-08-10
The Chief of Police of Atlantic City was unlawfully denied
salary increases granted to his subordinates contrary to
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-179. The City acknowledged that he was awarded
retroactive salary increases as part of a settlement of all
claims because the increases had been wrongfully withheld. The
Division of Pensions and Benefits employed an erroneous
interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(26) to conclude that the
reasons for including this award in the settlement were
irrelevant. The mere fact that those increases coincided with
the police chief's retirement did not render them "individual
07-08-10 IN THE MATTER OF ARTHUR C. SNELLBAKER
A-1443-09T2
The Chief of Police of Atlantic City was unlawfully denied
salary increases granted to his subordinates contrary to
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-179. The City acknowledged that he was awarded
retroactive salary increases as part of a settlement of all
claims because the increases had been wrongfully withheld. The
Division of Pensions and Benefits employed an erroneous
interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(26) to conclude that the
reasons for including this award in the settlement were
irrelevant. The mere fact that those increases coincided with
the police chief's retirement did not render them "individual
salary adjustments . . . granted primarily in anticipation of"
his retirement that are not creditable for retirement benefits.
It is necessary to evaluate all the factors relevant to the
award of the increase and the employee's retirement to determine
whether the salary adjustment was granted primarily in
anticipation of retirement. The facts, as adopted by the
Division, clearly show that the retroactive salary increases
here were not granted primarily for that purpose.here were not granted primarily for that purpose.
The Chief of Police of Atlantic City was unlawfully denied
salary increases granted to his subordinates contrary to
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-179. The City acknowledged that he was awarded
retroactive salary increases as part of a settlement of all
claims because the increases had been wrongfully withheld. The
Division of Pensions and Benefits employed an erroneous
interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(26) to conclude that the
reasons for including this award in the settlement were
irrelevant. The mere fact that those increases coincided with
the police chief's retirement did not render them "individual
07-08-10 IN THE MATTER OF ARTHUR C. SNELLBAKER
A-1443-09T2
The Chief of Police of Atlantic City was unlawfully denied
salary increases granted to his subordinates contrary to
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-179. The City acknowledged that he was awarded
retroactive salary increases as part of a settlement of all
claims because the increases had been wrongfully withheld. The
Division of Pensions and Benefits employed an erroneous
interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(26) to conclude that the
reasons for including this award in the settlement were
irrelevant. The mere fact that those increases coincided with
the police chief's retirement did not render them "individual
salary adjustments . . . granted primarily in anticipation of"
his retirement that are not creditable for retirement benefits.
It is necessary to evaluate all the factors relevant to the
award of the increase and the employee's retirement to determine
whether the salary adjustment was granted primarily in
anticipation of retirement. The facts, as adopted by the
Division, clearly show that the retroactive salary increases
here were not granted primarily for that purpose.here were not granted primarily for that purpose.
July 7, 2010
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ENDER F. POMPA A-0139-08T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. ENDER F. POMPA A-0139-08T4 (7-2-10)
Following his conviction of various drug offenses,
defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress in
excess of thirty pounds of marijuana seized by police without a
warrant from a closet in the sleeper cabin of defendant's
tractor trailer. The court held that the closely regulated
business exception permitted a warrantless administrative
inspection of certain areas of the tractor trailer, but
concluded that the search turned unlawful when it progressed
into unregulated areas without the exigent circumstances
required by State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009).
Following his conviction of various drug offenses,
defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress in
excess of thirty pounds of marijuana seized by police without a
warrant from a closet in the sleeper cabin of defendant's
tractor trailer. The court held that the closely regulated
business exception permitted a warrantless administrative
inspection of certain areas of the tractor trailer, but
concluded that the search turned unlawful when it progressed
into unregulated areas without the exigent circumstances
required by State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009).
STATE v. SCHMIDT A-2237-08T4
STATE v. SCHMIDT A-2237-08T4 7-1-10
In this opinion we hold that (1) the police are required to
comply with N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) by reading the standard
language concerning the consequences of a refusal to take an
Alcotest (part two of the Standard Statement) when a defendant
unequivocally agrees to submit to an Alcotest but then fails
without reasonable excuse to produce a valid sample and (2) the
police have the discretion to discontinue the Alcotest and
charge the arrestee with refusal without affording the arrestee
the maximum eleven attempts that the Alcotest machine permits.
In this opinion we hold that (1) the police are required to
comply with N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(e) by reading the standard
language concerning the consequences of a refusal to take an
Alcotest (part two of the Standard Statement) when a defendant
unequivocally agrees to submit to an Alcotest but then fails
without reasonable excuse to produce a valid sample and (2) the
police have the discretion to discontinue the Alcotest and
charge the arrestee with refusal without affording the arrestee
the maximum eleven attempts that the Alcotest machine permits.
July 4, 2010
Kenneth Vercammen Law Office 25th Anniversary Party Friday, July 30, 2010
Kenneth Vercammen Law Office
25th Anniversary Party
Friday, July 30, 2010
"Celebrating 25 years of providing excellent service to clients and the community"
1985-2010
Happy Hour, Open House, Client & Community Appreciation Social. Open to the public 4-7 PM
Food, Refreshments, T- shirts and special gifts
The Law office is located at 2053 Woodbridge Avenue, Edison, NJ 08817 near the Nixon Post Office, approximately 1/2 mile from Route 1/ Wick Plaza, and 1 mile from Middlesex County College. There is 50 parking spaces nearby on Russell Ave. and Lillian St. around the corner from Kim’s Kafe, on Woodbridge Ave. near the Green Derby Tavern, and across the street on School House Lane.
Visit our website at www.njlaws.com for Directions and other details or call and we will fax directions or email at KenV@njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. at (732) 572-0500(Law office)
Fax form to 732-572-0030 or email
kenvnjlaws@verizon.net
-Yes, We will be attending the party
Name: _____________________________
email: _____________________________
http://www.kennethvercammen.com/25th.party.html
25th Anniversary Party
Friday, July 30, 2010
"Celebrating 25 years of providing excellent service to clients and the community"
1985-2010
Happy Hour, Open House, Client & Community Appreciation Social. Open to the public 4-7 PM
Food, Refreshments, T- shirts and special gifts
The Law office is located at 2053 Woodbridge Avenue, Edison, NJ 08817 near the Nixon Post Office, approximately 1/2 mile from Route 1/ Wick Plaza, and 1 mile from Middlesex County College. There is 50 parking spaces nearby on Russell Ave. and Lillian St. around the corner from Kim’s Kafe, on Woodbridge Ave. near the Green Derby Tavern, and across the street on School House Lane.
Visit our website at www.njlaws.com for Directions and other details or call and we will fax directions or email at KenV@njlaws.com
Kenneth Vercammen, Esq. at (732) 572-0500(Law office)
Fax form to 732-572-0030 or email
kenvnjlaws@verizon.net
-Yes, We will be attending the party
Name: _____________________________
email: _____________________________
http://www.kennethvercammen.com/25th.party.html
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