State in the Interest of K.O., a minor (A-28-12;
N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous
predicate adjudications for the imposition of an
extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one
that resulted in a juvenile or adult facility,
exclusive of the adjudication for which the
disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. 2-24-14
The issue in this appeal is whether N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two previous adjudications or whether the adjudication for which a juvenile presently is being sentenced may itself count as the second predicate offense that qualifies the juvenile for an extended-term sentence.
1 was adjudged delinquent for committing an act that would have constituted second-degree robbery if committed by an adult. That adjudication subjected him to a maximum period of incarceration of three years under section 4A-44(d)(1)(d) of the Juvenile Justice Code (Code), N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20 to -90. On July 27, 2009, at a disposition hearing, the State moved for the imposition of an extended term of incarceration under section 4A-44(d)(3) of the Code, which authorizes the Family Part court to impose an extended-term sentence on a juvenile adjudged delinquent of a qualifying present offense if the court “finds that the juvenile was adjudged delinquent on at least two separate occasions, for offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the first or second degree, and was previously committed to an adult or juvenile facility.”
Kyle had been adjudicated delinquent on three occasions prior to the offense giving rise to this appeal. The first two adjudications involved minor offenses that did not meet section 4A-44(d)(3)’s predicate requirement of first- or second-degree offense adjudications. Also, neither of those adjudications resulted in his commitment to a juvenile detention facility. However, in March 2008 Kyle was adjudged delinquent of second-degree aggravated assault and was sentenced, consistent with a plea-agreement, to twenty-four months’ incarceration at the New Jersey Training School. Kyle was subsequently placed in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP). On March 3, 2009, Kyle’s participation in the program was terminated after he was deemed noncompliant. The Family Part court, however, dismissed the JISP violation and discharged the few months remaining on Kyle’s sentence, noting his approaching eighteenth birthday. Less than two months later, Kyle committed the act of delinquency resulting in his current sentence and this appeal.
In respect of the challenged sentence, the disposition court held, after taking Kyle’s prior adjudication on the second-degree aggravated assault charge and the present adjudication into consideration, that as a matter of law Kyle was extended-term eligible under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3). The court sentenced Kyle to the maximum permissible term of three years at a juvenile detention facility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(1) with an additional two-year extended term pursuant to section 4A-44(d)(3).
Kyle appealed his sentence and the Appellate Division affirmed. In re K.O., 424 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 2012). The panel interpreted section 4A-44(d)(3) as permitting the imposition of an extended term whenever there are two separate occasions of a first- or second-degree offense, one of which involved a period of incarceration. Noting that section 4A-44(d)(3) does not refer to previous or prior offenses, the panel rejected the argument that section 4A-44(d)(3) requires two previous adjudications in order for a juvenile to be extended-term eligible for a present adjudication. The panel found that Kyle qualified for an extended term and that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court granted Kyle’s petition for certification. 212 N.J. 460 (2012).
HELD: N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications for the imposition of an extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile.
1. Because statutory interpretation involves the examination of legal issues, it is considered a question of law. Accordingly, a de novo standard of review applies on appeal. Statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning and be construed in a common-sense manner. The Court’s overriding goal is to discern and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statutory provision at issue. Where the language is unclear or ambiguous, or if the Legislature’s intention is otherwise uncertain, resort may be had to extrinsic aids to “assist [the Court] in [its] understanding of the Legislature’s will.” Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264 (2008).
2. Under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3), an extended term may be imposed “if [the court] finds that the juvenile was adjudged delinquent on at least two separate occasions, for offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the first or second degree, and was previously committed to an adult or juvenile facility.” In this part of the statute, the Legislature has moved to the past tense, and not just for the past adjudication but also for the additional requirement that at least one such adjudication resulted in commitment to a juvenile or adult facility. The words refer to someone who “was adjudicated” and “was previously committed” on at least one such occasion to a facility. Both conditions clearly are from the person’s past and do not naturally suggest the inclusion of the present adjudication before the disposition court. The Court is unpersuaded that the failure to include the word “previously” twice when identifying the two required findings compels a plain language reading that the present adjudication may count as one of two separate offenses. The language of section 4A-44(d)(3) points to a natural reading that does not favor the State’s position or the extended-term sentence imposed on Kyle. To the extent one could argue that there is some ambiguity in the text of the section, the Court may resort to legislative history. Here, legislative history is silent on the specific issue before the Court. Further, to the extent that section 4A-44(d)(3) is not a model of perfect clarity, because it is a juvenile justice statute involving among the most severe sanctions that can be imposed on a juvenile, principles of lenity deserve consideration. To the extent that reasonable people can differ on whether the Legislature indeed intended to allow for an extended-term sentence for individuals like Kyle, who have only one previous separate predicate offense, not including the offense for which they are being sentenced, the Court concludes that the more lenient construction of the statute should pertain. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. The imposition of an extended term for Kyle transgresses that interpretation of the statute. The Court therefore reverses the extended-term sentence imposed.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
1 was adjudged delinquent for committing an act that would have constituted second-degree robbery if committed by an adult. That adjudication subjected him to a maximum period of incarceration of three years under section 4A-44(d)(1)(d) of the Juvenile Justice Code (Code), N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20 to -90. On July 27, 2009, at a disposition hearing, the State moved for the imposition of an extended term of incarceration under section 4A-44(d)(3) of the Code, which authorizes the Family Part court to impose an extended-term sentence on a juvenile adjudged delinquent of a qualifying present offense if the court “finds that the juvenile was adjudged delinquent on at least two separate occasions, for offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the first or second degree, and was previously committed to an adult or juvenile facility.”
Kyle had been adjudicated delinquent on three occasions prior to the offense giving rise to this appeal. The first two adjudications involved minor offenses that did not meet section 4A-44(d)(3)’s predicate requirement of first- or second-degree offense adjudications. Also, neither of those adjudications resulted in his commitment to a juvenile detention facility. However, in March 2008 Kyle was adjudged delinquent of second-degree aggravated assault and was sentenced, consistent with a plea-agreement, to twenty-four months’ incarceration at the New Jersey Training School. Kyle was subsequently placed in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP). On March 3, 2009, Kyle’s participation in the program was terminated after he was deemed noncompliant. The Family Part court, however, dismissed the JISP violation and discharged the few months remaining on Kyle’s sentence, noting his approaching eighteenth birthday. Less than two months later, Kyle committed the act of delinquency resulting in his current sentence and this appeal.
In respect of the challenged sentence, the disposition court held, after taking Kyle’s prior adjudication on the second-degree aggravated assault charge and the present adjudication into consideration, that as a matter of law Kyle was extended-term eligible under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3). The court sentenced Kyle to the maximum permissible term of three years at a juvenile detention facility pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(1) with an additional two-year extended term pursuant to section 4A-44(d)(3).
Kyle appealed his sentence and the Appellate Division affirmed. In re K.O., 424 N.J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 2012). The panel interpreted section 4A-44(d)(3) as permitting the imposition of an extended term whenever there are two separate occasions of a first- or second-degree offense, one of which involved a period of incarceration. Noting that section 4A-44(d)(3) does not refer to previous or prior offenses, the panel rejected the argument that section 4A-44(d)(3) requires two previous adjudications in order for a juvenile to be extended-term eligible for a present adjudication. The panel found that Kyle qualified for an extended term and that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion.
The Supreme Court granted Kyle’s petition for certification. 212 N.J. 460 (2012).
HELD: N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications for the imposition of an extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile.
1. Because statutory interpretation involves the examination of legal issues, it is considered a question of law. Accordingly, a de novo standard of review applies on appeal. Statutory language should be given its ordinary meaning and be construed in a common-sense manner. The Court’s overriding goal is to discern and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statutory provision at issue. Where the language is unclear or ambiguous, or if the Legislature’s intention is otherwise uncertain, resort may be had to extrinsic aids to “assist [the Court] in [its] understanding of the Legislature’s will.” Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264 (2008).
2. Under N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3), an extended term may be imposed “if [the court] finds that the juvenile was adjudged delinquent on at least two separate occasions, for offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime of the first or second degree, and was previously committed to an adult or juvenile facility.” In this part of the statute, the Legislature has moved to the past tense, and not just for the past adjudication but also for the additional requirement that at least one such adjudication resulted in commitment to a juvenile or adult facility. The words refer to someone who “was adjudicated” and “was previously committed” on at least one such occasion to a facility. Both conditions clearly are from the person’s past and do not naturally suggest the inclusion of the present adjudication before the disposition court. The Court is unpersuaded that the failure to include the word “previously” twice when identifying the two required findings compels a plain language reading that the present adjudication may count as one of two separate offenses. The language of section 4A-44(d)(3) points to a natural reading that does not favor the State’s position or the extended-term sentence imposed on Kyle. To the extent one could argue that there is some ambiguity in the text of the section, the Court may resort to legislative history. Here, legislative history is silent on the specific issue before the Court. Further, to the extent that section 4A-44(d)(3) is not a model of perfect clarity, because it is a juvenile justice statute involving among the most severe sanctions that can be imposed on a juvenile, principles of lenity deserve consideration. To the extent that reasonable people can differ on whether the Legislature indeed intended to allow for an extended-term sentence for individuals like Kyle, who have only one previous separate predicate offense, not including the offense for which they are being sentenced, the Court concludes that the more lenient construction of the statute should pertain. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. The imposition of an extended term for Kyle transgresses that interpretation of the statute. The Court therefore reverses the extended-term sentence imposed.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED.
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